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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
EDITH N. GARDNER,
Plaintiff, Respondent

vs.

Case No. 7342

E.A.RL W. GARDNER,
Defendant, Appellant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This state1nent of facts is ·given not merely as a
contradiction, but for a more complete understanding of
the material facts omitted in appellant's brief. The
respondent and appellant inter-married, at Pocatello,
Idaho, on June 15, 1948, ( R. 38) and they returned to
Logan, and resided with respondent's mother, Rebecca
Yonk. (R. 38). The respondent had lived in Logan for
about 2 years continuously prior to date of filing suii
for divorce against the appellant. (R. 37). Both parties
had been married before, ( R. 40, 41, 51, 153) the plaintiff
had one married daughter residing in Salt Lake City, (R.
40, 41) and a married son residing at San Rafael, Cali-
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fornia. (R. 51). Appellant also had children by prior
marriage. ( R. 153).
When appellant married the respondent he had no
home; (R. 43, 64) but owned a Chrysler car and an
equity in a farm at Santaquinn, Utah, which was leased
during the year, 1948, and the tenant was residing on the
property. (R. 43, 44). About September 23, 1948, defendant sold his equity in the farm. From the date of
their marriage to the date this action was commenced,
the appellant was un-employed, (R. 47), and spent a
portion of the time at Logan with respondent and the
other portion away from Logan, just where, plainti£1!
was not always informed.. (R. 47). Frequently he got
in his car and left, without informing respondent where
he was going or when he would return. (R. 56). He
came and went as he pleased and lived a life of apparent
leisure. (R. 47). While in Logan, he lived with respondent at her mother's home, but bought no groceries
for the table. (R. 56). In fact, shortly prior to the
marriage, appellant borrowed $300.00 from respondent,
which had not been repaid at the time this action wa~
commenced. (R. 59). In November, and after the commencement of this action, he sent her $50.00 to meet him
in Reno, but she declined to go and credited this money
to the foresaid loan. (R. 59).
The plaintiff testified that defendant was of a jealous and ill tempered disposition. (R. 38, 46). These
parties had only been rnarried about two weeks when
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appellant, returning to Logan from one of his out of
town trips, learned that the respondent had gone to the
cemetery with a niece to decorate a grave and respondent had only been absent about fifteen minutes when
the appellant arrived home. (R. 38). He thereupon became angry and registered at a Logan hotel. The respondent, upon returning home, learned that appellant
had been there and expecting that he would return momentarily, prepared dinner and waited for appellant
until 7 o'clock p. m., when he phoned her from the hotel.
(R. 39). Respondent told him that dinner was read.v
and invited him to come home, but he refused and remained in the hotel for two days before he returned.
(R. 40).
There were several major quarrels thereafter as the
record will show. About July 17, when the appellant
had been away from Logan for several days, the respondent accompanied a lady friend to Salt Lake City,
and upon their arrival at the home of respondent's
daughter, the appellant came there shortly thereafter in
a very angry mood and caused quite a scene, (R. 41-44)
and upon that occasion, the appellant threatened the
respondent with divorce, and took her to his lawyer's
office for that purpose. (R. 43). But his lawyer was
busy and they were therefore unable to see him and
appellant suggested to respondent that they drive to
Beaver, Utah, which they did and remained two days.
Upon their return from Beaver, and when arriving near
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Salt Lake City, a dispute arose between them as to
whether or not they should remain in Salt Lake City that
night, or drive on to Logan. ( R. 45).
The testimony also shows that the defendant was
very discourteous and unfriendly with plaintiff's lady
friends and also toward members of her family. The
fact that appellant refused to greet respondent's friends
and relatives, or be courteous to them, naturally hurt
and humHiated her, and it created a strained atmosphere
which resulted in her friends remaining away from her
home. (R. 56, 57). When respondent remonstrated with
appellant to discontinue his discourteous treatment toward her friends and relatives, he refused to change. (R.
57).
While it is not possible to enumerate all the quarrels
had between the parties during the time that they lived
together, as respondent testified that she could not recall
all of them. (R. 56). But she summarized as follows:
"Well, it seems like we quarreled every time we met, as
nearly as I remember. Whether I went to Salt Lake, or
he came to Logan, we nearly always had a quarrel. I
didn't say all the time, but nearly everytime we met, it
ended up in a quarrel. If it didn't start that way it
ended up that way. We just didn't get along. (R. 48).
The appellant had no home to take the respondent
to, (R. 64) between the date of marriage (June 15) and
the date they left on the trip to California (September
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25), appellant made no attempt to provide a home for
respondent. ( R. 64).
The appellant, respondent, and the latter's mother
left for California on September 25. (R. 48). With respect to purpose of the California trip, respondent testified: ''Well, we sort of was going on a trip and look for
a place at the same time. If things went well that was
our intentions, but they didn't go well.". (R. 48). They
arrived in California the latter part of September, and
ren1ained there until October 14, (R. 51) and while there
they lived with respondent's son. (R. 51). The parties
purchased a home, but did not occupy it. (R. 49-50).
They opened a bank account in the Bank of America at
San Rafael. Respondent deposited $1400.00, of her
savings, and appellant deposited $4000.00, which he received from sale of farm property. (R. 50). They made
a partial payment of $1400.00 on purchase price and
agreed to pay the balance thereof in monthly payments.
(R. 51). After the initial payment was made and prior
to their leaving California, the appellant withdrew
$3000.00, from said bank account by means of a cashier's
check and carried the check back to Utah with him, which
he did without respondent's knowledge. (R. 172).
After several heated quarrels between these parties
during the latter portion of their sojourn in California,
which were provoked by appellant, (R. 51, 52, 85) he said
-"this is the finish, I'm going back to Utah." (R. 52).
So they immediately thereafter left for Logan, (R. 52,
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53) and when they arrived there on October 16, appel-

lant,"unloaded all his things and was going

to

hunt

deer.'' He immediately left Logan for the deer hunt in
the vicinity of Wasatch County and was absent about
two weeks before he returned. (R. 53, 54). In the meantime, respondent had commenced her action for divorce
(October 28). (R. 3, 53). These parties did not
cohabit together· as man and wife after the last quarrel
in California.
The respondent testified that appellant frequently
provoked quarrels without provocation, and she couldn't
see any reason for an argument on many of the occasions when he suddenly and unexpectedly started one.
(R. 53). Respondent also testified that as a result of
appellant's conduct she became "nervous and upset and
was not at ease around him." (R. 53). Prior to her
marriage, respondent enjoyed good health but after living with appellant from June 15, to October 16, she became very nervous and miserable and lost weight. (R.
54, 55).
ARGUMENT
Point l-The District Court had jurisdiction to enter
aecree of divorce.
Appellant questions the jurisdiction of the lower
court to enter a decree of divorce because it is contended
that respondent was not a bona-fide resident of the State
of Utah, and County of Cache for a period of three
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n1onths prior to the co1n1nencement of the action.
This contention is predicated upon these propositions; viz.,-Appellant owned property in Santaquinn,
Dtah, prior to marriage; and his ownership in the san1e
continued until September 23, 1948; and he had a place
to live on property even though the home thereon was
occupied by a tenant.
The foregoing propositions may be conceded, yet they
do not sustain appellant's contention that plaintiff was
not a boni-fide resident of Cache County, Utah, for more
than three months prior to the 28th day of October, 1948,
when this action was commenced. The evidence is undisputed that the respondent was residing with her mother
in Logan at the time of this marriage. (R. 37). The
parties were Inarried in Pocatello, Idaho, and immediately returned to Logan, where the respondent continued to resume her residence with her mother, and appellant took up his residence at the same place. The
fact that the appellant had an equity in a farm at Santaquinn does not conclusively prove that the appellant
lived there. There is no evidence that the appellant
owned any household furniture. None is mentioned in
the record. Neither is there any evidence, and appellant
does not claim, that he provided a home for the respondent at Santaquinn. From the evidence, it is fairly deducible that the appellant, being unemployed, was content to live with the respondent in the home furnished by
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her mother at Logan.

Respondent's

brother,

Alfred

Yonk, also testified that respondent had been a resident
of Cache County for more than three months prior to
commencement of divorce action. (R. 109).
The foregoing testimony definitely shows that respondent was an actual boni-fide resident of the County
of Cache and State of Utah, for more than three months
prior to October 28, 1948, when this action was commenced, and the appellant's testimony does not dispute
the fact that he and respondent made their home with
plaintiff's mother in Logan, from the date of their marriage. There is absolutely no evidence to prove that
these parties resided elsewhere. But counsel contends
that assuming that these parties were boni-fide residents
of Cache County, Utah, after their marriage on June 15.
yet they took up a new residence in the State of California about September 28, when they took a trip there.
With respect to their intentions, respondent testified:
"Well, we sort of was going on a trip and look for a
place at the same time. If things went well that was our
intentions, but they didn't go well." (R. 48). Conceding
for the sake of argument that when the parties left
Logan on this trip they entertained some intentions of
making their home in California, (R. 48) however, the
undisputed evidence shows that while they were there,
about 16 days, they lived as house guests at the home of
respondent's son. (R. 51). rrhey purchased a home, but
they did not occupy it, and before the time for occupancy
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arrived, they had returned to Logan on account
of having had several heated quarrels, and after
the last one, the respondent testified that appellant said
-''This is the finish. This is enough.'' ( R. 89). And
on the appellant's cross examination, he admitted, (R.
151) that what occurred between respondent and appellant in California was of such grave magnitude that it
disrupted their plan to stay in California, and that as a
result thereof they came back to Logan, (R. 151, 152).
And appellant then left the respondent in Logan, at her
place of residence and went ''deer hunting,'' and did not
return until October 30th, two days after the divorce
action had been filed. (R. 3). It thus definitely appears
from the evidence, that the California trip resulted in a
complete failure to establish a residence there. (R. 89,
151, 152). And the California trip also had the effect
of terminating their marital relationship, as the appellant admitted after the last quarrel there, that it was
"the finish," between them. ( R. 89, 151, 152). How
then can appellant contend that the parties established a
residence in California 1
It is contended on page 6 of appellant's. brief that he
considered himself domiciled in Santaquinn. The record
is absolutely void of any fact to support this conclusion,
in fact there is no evidence in the record that appellant
ever stayed overnight on the farm at Santaquinn. So
that the reasons stated on page 6 of appellant's brief are
mere conclusions and are not based upon any facts.
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The case of Kidman v. Kid1nan, 164 P. 2d, 201, is cited
by appellant, but that case is not authority for appellant's contention. In that case the plaintiff's residence
for the statutory period was admitted by the defendant.
Respondent respectfully subn1its that the rule referred to in Section 31, Vol. 17, Am. J ur. page 609, is not
in point with the facts in the instant case. These parties
had not moved into a home in the State of California.
On October 14, when they left California, they had not
established a residence there.
The fact that appellant went back to California after
the divorce action was commenced, is immaterial because
it occurred after the Court acquired jurisdiction. The
fact that appellant made some improvements on the
house in California was undoubtedly done to finish it for
resale purposes. This is evidenced by the fact that after
appellant went to California in November, and after this
action was commenced, he listed the property for sale or
for rent. (R. 180-182).
On page 8 of appellant's brief counsel says:
"The fact that Mr. Gardner regarded California his home is further borne out by the fact
that after the California h01ne became vacant he
entered into it and made extensive repairs and he
remodeled the place. He got it ready for his wife
and requested that she come and live at their
home. However, in the meantime, she had returned to Logan, and after being in Utah for the
short period of twelve days, she commenced
divorce proceedings.''
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It is respectfully sub1nitted that the foregoing state~
1nent is diametrically opposed to the undisputed evidence. The appellant testified that they returned to Logan from California on October 14th. (R. 152). He then
went deer hunting in the vicinity of Wa~atch County. (R.
154), and spent from October 16-28 deer hunting, (R.
153). Appellant then returned to Salt Lake City and
remained there until October 30th, when he came to
Logan. ( R. 154). This action was commenced on
October 28th, (R. 3) and the summons was served upon
appellant on October 29th, (R. 4). It thus definitely appears that appellant remained in Utah until after the
action was commenced. In fact, appellant testified that
he left Salt Lake for California on Sunday afternoon,
October 31st, (R. 158) and that he made the repairs on
the home after returning to California, and after the
divorce action was commenced. (R. 161-164).
The Utah case of Grant v. Lawrence, 108 Pac. 931 is
cited by appellant on page 9 of his brief. While that
case is distinguishable on the facts from the case at bar,
yet the rule is stated (2nd head note) that a man's place
oi residence is a question of fact and not of law. When
that rule is applied to the facts in the case at bar, it will
be seen that plaintiff was a boni-fide resident of Cache
County, and State of Utah, for more than three months
prior to October 28th, when this action was commenced.
Counsel also cites the Arizona case of Sneed v. Sneed,
123 Pac. 312. This case is also authority for respon-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
dent's contention that

th~

parties did not establish a

residence in California. In defining ''an actual boni-fide
resident,'' the Arizona Court said:
''We conclude that ' an actual boni-fide resident' means a person who is in Arizona to reside
permanently, and who, at least for the time being,
entertains no idea of having or seeking a permanent home elsewhere.''
When the foregoing definition is applied to the facts
in the instant case, it will be seen that these parties did
not become actual boni-fide residents of California, during their brief and temporary so-journ there between
September 27, and October 14.
Point No. II-Court had discretionary power to
award plaintiff attorneys fees.
Counsel contends ·that it was abuse of discretion to
award attorneys fees in the absence of allegations, a
prayer, or any proof concerning such fees.
This court held in the case of Anderson v. Anderson,
181 Pac. 168, cited by appellant, that the wife, plaintiff in
that action, was entitled to attorney's fees, under the
statute as well as at common law. In so holding, this
court said:
"There is absolutely no merit in the contention made that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
attorney fee allowed her by the trial court. We
thin:K the trial court was empowered to make the
order concerning attorney's fees under C01np.
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Laws 1917, Sections 2998, 3010, and 3011, either
before or at the conclusion of the trial. Independent of statute, under the rules of the common la\v, the plaintiff was entitled to employ
counsel and render the defendant liable to pay
for the services rendered by him in her suit.''
The other Utah case cited by appellant on page 10 of
his brief, Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 P. 2d. 262, is not
authority for his contention, because that case was an
annulment suit. They were not legally married, therefore, she had no legal claim upon the defendant for support.
Other Utah cases holding that the allowance of suit
money or attorney fees is largely a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court are : Burtt v. Burtt,
59 Utah 457, 204 P. 91; Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah
9, 12 P. 2nd. 364; Weiss v. Weiss, 179 P. 2d. 1005.
There is probably no rule more uniformly established
by the Courts of the several states than the rule giving
the trial court the power to grant the wife attorney's
fees. In some recent cases so holding from other states
are Zook v Zook (Colo.) 195 P. 2d. 287 ; Holly v Holly
(Kan.) 188 P. 2d. 650; Fallon v. Fallon (Cal. App.) 189
P. 2d. 766; Walker v. Walker (Tex. Civ. App.) 201 S. W.
2d. 261. This rule is also laid down in 19 C. J. 228, Sec.
545, in the following language:
"The allowance of suit money and counseJ
fees to a wife, and the amount thereof, as in the
case of an allowance of temporary alimony, is
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largely within the discretion of the trial court,
to be exercised in view of the conditions and circumstances of the case, and it will not be disturbed on appeal unless this discretion has been
abused.'' (Italics added).
In paragraph "d" of

the

prayer

of

plaintiff's

amended complaint, she prayed for equitable relief, and
this prayer invoked the equitable powers of the Court.
Appellant further contends that there was no proof
on which to base an award of attorney's fees. This Court
held in the Anderson case, supra, that the trial court
could make an award for attorney's fees without taking
testimony to support the same, and in so holding said :
''So, too, the trial court had the right to consult his own experience and knowledge, without
taking testimony, as to what was reasonable in
the particular case. Peyre v. Peyre, 79 Cal. 336,
21 Pac. 838."
Point III-The findings, conclusions and decree are
supported by competent as well as by a preponderance
of the evidence.
The appellant's contention (Point III) that the evidence adduced does not support the findings, conclusions
and decree, has been answered largely under respondent's discussion of the evidence under Point I herein.
The record is replete with evidence showing appellant's irregular and malicious conduct, which provoked
trouble and quarrels between these parties. Probably
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the principal reason why appellant exhibited the quarrelsonle attitude and disposition toward respondent as
shown by the evidence resulted from his unemployment
and idleness. For that reason, he may have had an inferiority complex, and in order to show his importance
and authority he felt it necessary to provoke frequent
quarrels with respondent.
Counsel for appellant, on pages 11 and 13 of his brief,
cites three Utah cases, Ahlborn v. Ahlborn, 204 P. 99;
Hartwell v. Hartwell, 69 P. 265; and Cawley v. Cawley,
202 P. 10, as authority for his contention that if both
parties to the action are guilty of misconduct, neither
party is entitled to a divorce. When the facts in those
cases are examined, it will be seen that they are clearly
distinguishable from the case at bar. In all those cases
the trial court denied plaintiff a divorce and dismissed
the action.
While in the case at bar, the trial court granted the
plaintiff a divorce based upon competent evidence. The
lower court heard the testimony and observed the de·meanor of the wisnesses. He was in a position to weigh
and consider the testimony, and the plaintiff's testimony
is corroborated in many material respects by other witnesses, and defendant does not seriously dispute plaintiff's evidence.
Counsel at page 12 of appellant's brief admits that
there were more quarrels between these parties than one
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would like to see in a marriage relation, but he attempts
to excuse appellant's conduct because it is contended
. that he had to live with his mother-in-law. It is respectfully submitted that the record will not support counsel's contention. For instance, on July 2, a mere two
weeks after the marriage, because respondent had gone
to the cemetery with her neice, and was not home to greet
appellant :vhen he returned unexpectedly from one of his
out of to·wn trips, he became so angry that he left in a
huff and registered at a Logan hotel and remained there
two days. (R. 38, 39). Was the mother-in-law to blame
for this incident~ She wasn't home at the time.
And again on July 17, about one month after the
marriage, at Salt Lake City, at home of respondent's
daughter, the appellant like a "bolt out of the blue"
came thundering into the home and called them a "bunch
of liars." (R. 41). The appellant had left Logan a few
days before on one of his trips, and when he called
Logan and learned respondent had left for Salt Lake
City, with l\1:rs. Rogers, he went into a rage and lost control of his temper when there was no occasion for such
conduct on his part. ( R. 41-44). And again the query:
Was his mother-in-law, in any manner, involved in this
incident? She wasn't even present. On this occasion,
and although they had only been married about a
month, yet he threatened respondent with a divorce.
(R. 43).
The only deduction that may be made from appel-
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lant's conduct is that he wanted to reserve the right to
come and go as he pleased, but he expected respondent
to be home whenever he returned, or whenever he happened to call her on the telephone.
The rule is well settled, even in equity cases, that the
findings of the court, if supported by cornpetent evidenc(~
will be sustained by this court, and the rule is also well
established that the ''appellant has the burden of showing that the evidence preponderates against the findings
assailed, on appeal, as not supported by the evidence.''
4 C. J. 777, Section 2727. Little v. Gorman 39 Utah 63,
114 P. 321.
Point IV-Condonation.
It is contended on page 13 of appellant's brief that
the parties cohabited together as man and wife on the
return trip from California, which condoned improper
acts, if any, of appellant which occurred before that time.
This contention is not supported by the evidence. The
respondent testified that she did not cohabit with appellant after the last quarrel. (R. 56). The only reference
made to this matter by appellant is found on pages 143
and 144 of the record. But an examination of the record
on those pages does not disclose any testimony by ap-

pellant that he cohabited with respondent after their last
quarrel in California; and there is absolutely no evidence of a reconciliation after the parties returned from
their California trip. The appellant left immediately on
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a deer hunt, (R. 152) and this action was commenced
before he returned therefrom.
The evidence does show that respondent condoned
previous cruel acts committed by appellant, but there i~
no evidence in the record showing that she condoned the
last quarrel in California, which resulted in appellant's
decision to return to Logan and also respondent's decision to institute divorse action against appellant. (R.
52, 151).
Respondent respectfully submits that the following
rule is controlling here:
"A repetition of the offense after condonation
revives the original offense. Thus if a reconciliation takes place after a separation because of
cruelty, subsequent cruel conduct of the guilty
party revives the former acts and permits a
divorce upon the ground of all acts of cruelty,
either before or after the reconciliation. A'n
offense which has been condoned may be revived
not only by a repetition of the same offense, but
also by the subsequent commission of other marital offenses." 19 C. J. 88, Sections 204, 205.
For the foregoing reasons respondent respectfully
submits that the judgment and decree of the trial court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

L. E. NELSON,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
J

